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
Hegel's work on action has for a long time required serious attention, not least due to the feeling 
amongst Hegelians that, like the recent revival of interest in his social and political thought, the 
arguments offered and sketched could make a real contribution to contemporary debates in the 
philosophy of action. However, to do justice to such sentiments, an author was required who 
embodied both a thorough understanding of Hegel as well as a mastery of recent debates in the 
philosophy of action. The present volume presents us with the next best thing: two editors, one of 
which is a Hegelian and the other of which a philosopher of action theory. In the introduction, they 
set out the aims of the book: one, to survey engagements between contemporary action theory and 
Hegel; and two, to orient possible future directions of the interaction. To achieve these aims, the 
present volume has commissioned original articles (or, at least, eleven out of the fourteen articles 
are original) rather than recompile already present work. Of the three re-published articles, there are 
welcome returns for Charles Taylor who originally set the ball rolling as well as Alisdair 
MacIntyre’s not-so veiled critique of psychologism via Hegel’s own discussion of his 
contemporaries' scientific approaches to questions of action. (I have never met anyone who has read 
MacIntyre’s article and not enjoyed it; which is a strange compliment for a philosophy article, 
especially one on Hegel!) Finally, there is also a worthy reprint of McDowell's controversial reading 
of the dialectic of recognition as between I and I-as-an-other.  All three republished articles 
seamlessly integrate with the original contributions from a list of recognizable authors.  

Before proceeding to summarize the content of the book, it is only fair to begin this review 
with the praise that the book deserves: I heartily recommend the collection of articles to, first and 
foremost, philosophers working in field of the theory of action because they will undoubtedly be 
forced to engage with Hegel’s thought and, secondly, to historians of philosophy, especially those 
with an interest in understanding the philosophical work of Hegel. That the book serves such 
diverse audiences is testimony to the editors’ fine work in preparing the articles, ordering them and 
successfully achieving the two aims that they set themselves. In fact, the role of the editors – over 
and above the sum of the contributors’ pieces – should not be underestimated; they have managed to 
structure the book in such a way that it reflects Hegel’s own dialectic of action, beginning from our 
simplest intuitions and engaging in a thoroughgoing philosophical conversation with our 
progressive understanding of full human action. 

The introduction gives an overview of the themes of contemporary action theory (no doubt for 
the benefit of those submerged in the mire of Hegelianism) as well as an overview of how Hegelian 
theory relates to these themes (no doubt for the benefit of those submerged in the mire of 
contemporary action theory). The familiar themes form a loose framework for the articles: the 
ontology of action; the conceptual framework of action (the status and metaphysics of concepts 
such as intention, agent and so on); the nature of agency; and the nature of freewill, agency and 
responsibility. The book is structured in pairs of articles that relate to the issues as well as 
mimicking a dialectical movement that is present in Hegel's own systematic thought: an 
interpretation is offered and then challenged by the next author, only for the salient elements from 
both to be revisited and reconciled to form the starting point of the first of the next pair of articles. 
Hegel’s work, it is contended, says something about all these framing themes, building up from the 
first to the last. He does do in a way that challenges the central agreement about action that has 
dominated (and to a certain extent) created the discipline in the 20th century.  

As the ordering of the articles reflects Hegel’s own development of the concept of action, 
then the best way to summarize the collection (but in no way to do justice to the nuances and 
disagreements involved) is to loosely follow the dialectical development as though the book were a 
cohesive whole (which it very nearly is; a formidable feat given the diversity of interpretation and 
voices on offer). The collection opens with Taylor's well-known interpretation of Hegel as 
proposing that the proper way to describe an action is non-atomism: an action cannot be divided 
into the constituent parts of intention and act.  Actions are not ontologically separate from their 
purposes but are in fact expressions of these purposes. Knowles continues this line of interpretation 
by looking more deeply at the causal status of intentions and reasons for action. The real problem, 
for Knowles, concerns unrealized intentions. If an intention is not ontologically separate from the 
action, then it would be problematic to talk about failed intentions: the tennis player who does his 
best to win a tennis match is surely intending to win the match even if his action is unsuccessful. 
Hegel apparently imposes a loose causality on actions in that we understand agents as if they are 
determined by their intentions, even if the ontological status of the causality is bracketed off. 

If Knowles, as he admits, finds the thesis of ontological inseparability of intention and 
action puzzling, then Pippin returns to the theme and develops Taylor’s idea.  For Pippin, the 
relationships between agents and actions is not a natural causal one (as compatibilists assume) nor a 
could-have-done-otherwise causal one (as libertarians suppose). It is rather the capacity to manage 
deliberation and that requires the social, retrospective negotiation of the agent's intention. Practical 
reason is not a self-relation between an inner intention and an outer action because the agent's 
relationship to himself is mediated by the other through the norms which make practical reason 
possible. Such norms are derived from a social context and the agent's descriptions of why he did X 
will be only provisional until confirmed by the other.  

McDowell takes umbrage at Pippin’s interpretation for two reasons: one, it commits Hegel 
to a bad argument in that a social context cultivates a responsiveness to reasons but does not 
determine what are in fact good reasons (otherwise we are, as Pippin is well aware, verging on 
relativism). Two, it also commits Hegel to a counter-intuitive position: Pippin's view that we only 
truly have our intention when we have acted is inconsistent with Hegel's “right of knowledge” (and 
mirrors the problem with failed intentions). The agent can learn that he alerted the burglars when he 
switched the light on, but he cannot feasibly admit that this was his intention all along. The concept 
of an intention allows us to separate deeds (what I brought about) from actions proper (what I did) 
and that requires granting the agent a certain privilege in the avowal of intentions. The real point of 
contention between Pippin and McDowell, though, concerns the former’s irrealism and the latter’s 
realism as concerns reasons for action: reasons for action, for McDowell, are not socially 
constituted, but participating in a good society will better allow deliberative agents to be responsive 
to real reasons. 

 The next chapter revisits Pippin’s retrospectivism in an attempt to keep its advantages whilst 
jettisoning its counter-intuitive consequences and Deligiorgi also manages to bring the first four 
articles together in a cohesive whole. Hegel exhibits four theoretical commitments. One, he is non-
cognitivist: the avowal of an intention is merely an expression of the agent's commitment to act (it 
does not cause the agent to act). Two, ascribable intentions are integral to the category of action and 
the formal structure of intentional action is borrowed from the laws of nature (viz. causality). Three, 
Hegel proposes an “error-theory” of agency which sidesteps the epistemic problem of actually 
locating the “agent” in any causal chain (was it the idea, the arm, or the finger that actually turned 
the light on?) Finally, ownership of an action is decided retrospectively through interpretation. 
Wood expands the idea of “owning” outcomes through his subtle discussion of imputability. He 
argues that Hegel develops the simplistic Kantian model which assumes that the intention is 
everything. Hegel can seemingly differentiate between direct aims, means to direct aims, and 
regrettable side-effects by categorizing the purpose, intention, deed and action separately. Kant 
can't. Such distinctions allow a full range of judgements about what should be imputed to an agent: 
double-effects, negligence, omissions and so on, by noting that some things belong to my purpose 
(and hence I know that I have brought them about) and some to the narrower direct aim. 

 The book then returns to the nature of reasons for action and Pinkard endeavours to show 
that the inner-outer relationship is not a metaphysical problem of putting self or spontaneous 
causation into the world. Hegel’s account of freedom is compatibilist and his theory of action is 
consistent with naturalism (biological reasons) but not reducible to them. The social evaluative 
schemes of what we should do (the motivating reasons) and how such intentions are expressed in 
action passes through the practical reasoning of the agent, but both belong to the world itself. The 
will confers a “stamp of approval” on reasons for action allowing the modern agent (as opposed to 
the ancient agent) to justify deviation from standard models of behaviour and also demonstrate why 
his actions do adequately express his intention even when the action is non-conventional or 
idiosyncratic. The “stamp of approval” (or “right of knowledge”) of practical deliberation is agency 
in that it identifies the loose causality between intention and action necessary for modern accounts 
of responsibility. The modern “stamp of approval” is developed further in Houlgate’s chapter that 
asserts Hegel’s concept of action is not morally neutral and hence is at odds with Pinkard's 
compatibilism. If we (and we should) consider Hegel's systematic discussion of action as a product 
of free will, then action is necessarily subject to moral evaluation. Right is actually existing freedom 
that requires affirmation (Pinkard's stamp of approval) by the subject and that this stamp of 
approval (or right of knowledge) is free agency. In the ancient world, permissible expressions of 
nobility, for example, were set in stone and agents were not able to deviate from them and still be 
noble whereas the modern agent is able to deviate from standard behaviour and justify his actions 
by offering an intention to public scrutiny.  

 The tension between scientific explanation and human behaviour is further exploited by 
MacIntyre who tries to show that dispositions are not sufficient to explain action because 
dispositions cannot form the basis of repeatable observations and the assigning of a trait to an agent 
is very often the cause of changes in behaviour. What we observe in nature is to be discovered, what 
we observe in humans in the expression of rational activity and scientistic descriptions are 
inappropriate.  If scientific explanations are problematic, then Schmidt am Busch offers a different 
concept, that of externalization or objectification consistent with MacIntyre's own interpretation of 
Hegel's alternative mode of explanation. Activity is externalizing oneself which exhibits three 
characteristics: the purpose is the agent's own because he can negate it or not through his personal 
conviction of its rightness; self-consciousness knows that it is the activity which brings about his 
purpose; and he acts as a participant in social interaction and under public scrutiny. 

 Moving from the conceptual framework and vocabulary of action to the nature of agency 
once more, Quante holds that Hegel's general argument strategy is to assert that being a person, a 
moral or an ethical agent is a normative stand sustained through inter-subjective recognition and 
consists in being treated as a a human being. This founds the individual's right to be evaluated in 
accordance with his purposes, his intentions and the moral quality of his action and Hegel justifies 
his theory of action by the intuitive self-understanding of ourselves as agents and through our social 
practices of ascribing responsibility. Quante's account of agency leads naturally on to the nature of 
reasons for action and Speight in the succeeding article argues that reason-given for Hegel is 
retrospective, socially inflected and implicitly holistic, resting upon a narrative account of agency. 
Action requires a sense of normative relationships which have dispositional importance for the 
agent and the agent assesses what he has done retrospectively and offers a narrative justification of 
it. Once more, the issue of retrospectivism appears central to the theory of action and these narrative 
justifications of what the agent did will have to be sensitive to how he “fits in” to a wider context 
and not just reflect his own plan and projects. 

 The strands from Pippin and McDowell and their consequences for responsibility demand an 
investigation into the nature of agency and free will. Menegoni concentrates on Speight's last point 
on the relationship between me as an individual akin to the narrative self of Velleman and the inter-
subjective normative structure of such meanings in order to avoid non-cognitivist conclusions. The 
conscience is identified as the stamp of approval of modern self-consciousness and the final 
offering, by Moyar, expands the nature of subjective and objective reasons for personal conviction 
by mapping it onto Nagel’s agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons for action, but also showing 
that Hegel’s picture is perhaps more convincing than that of Nagel. It seems that in ethical life, the 
institutions do not rely on any particular individual and are thus agent-neutral reasons. However, 
Moyar wants to say that the value realized by them is agent-neutral, but the reasons are agent-
relative. The individual agent has reasons to do things that derive from his identity (as father, as 
worker and so on), but, in the modern age, particularity is incorporated into self-conceptions that 
can be publicly shared and recognized as valuable (autonomy, equality and so on). This opens a 
space between the agent-neutral value of an institution and the agent-relative reasons for cohering to 
it. 

What emerges over the course of the book are several plateaux of tension that are inimical to 
a coherent and comprehensive explanation of human behaviour. Human behaviour is best 
understood as a loose causality between intention and act because proposing an agent with a right to 
knowledge is the most rational way to construct social and political institutions that distribute praise 
and blame and embody freedom (in its full Hegelian sense). Such a picture is not ontologically true; 
an agent is not to be identified as an element in a causal chain but instead retrospectively as the 
public “stamp of approval” which owns a set of outcomes directly, some indirectly and some 
contingently. Responsibility, then, modelled on ownership is the most rational way to distribute 
blame and credit and the social practices which support such agency (private property, modern 
institutions of punishment, individualism and so on) create reason-responsive beings who are able 
to exercise rational subjective choices that can be objectively and publicly legitimated. The tensions 
never truly dissipate, but the strength of this book is the suggestion that one can find the resolution 
of these tensions in a closer reading of Hegel's writings and all the authors faithfully represent some 
aspect of the many diverse voices to be found in Hegel himself. The articles deserve to be revisited 
for this reason and such re-visitation is best done in the context of the collection as a whole. 

What does Hegel’s theory of action add to our own contemporary debate? First, he offers a 
viable and coherent alternative to the current scientist hegemony by questioning the general 
reductionist paradigm and the assumption that intentions, like beliefs, can possibly be reduced to 
simple chemical reactions in the brain subject to the laws of physics. Second, he brings to the fore 
the problem of inner-outer whereby an inner intention is magically transubstantiated into a physical 
action. For him, the relationship between intention and action is between social event and social 
event and no difference in kind occurs. But, as such, the realm of Spirit is possibly ruled by 
arbitrariness in a way that the world of nature cannot, so the law of causality is imposed on it by 
thinking minds in order to make the most rational social institutions (punishment, private property 
and so on) actual. Third, the agent is not identified by a simple self-consciousness in possession of 
an intention, but rather as a concept that locates the moment of practical deliberation which confers 
on social reasons a personal conviction that accounts for responsibility.  In conclusion, the greatest 
credit ought to be conferred on the editors of this engaging and important book. Not only have they 
selected a collection of excellent articles, but they have presented and ordered them in a way that 
demands attention from a wide sphere of philosophical thinkers. 
